★ Bridge ecrecover checks result ≠ address(0)
Usual (USD0 / bUSD0 / USUAL)'s assessment for RD-F-151 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
L1OFTAdapter (0xE14C486b93C3B62F76F88cf8FE4B36fb672f3B26) does NOT use ecrecover internally. Message authentication is entirely delegated to LayerZero Endpoint V2. The adapter performs peer validation via isPeer() checks (source chain + peer address binding) but no direct signature verification. Wormhole-class ecrecover-zero-return vulnerability is not present in the OFT adapter code path. Endpoint V2 itself (0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c) is a hardened protocol layer that handles signature/DVN verification.
Sources #
- EtherscanUSD0 L1OFTAdapter — EtherscanL1OFTAdapter Etherscan code tab: no ecrecover in adapter; constructor uses endpoint 0x1a44076050125825900e736c501f859c50fe728c; peer validation via isPeer() from LayerZero OFT baseretrieved 2026-05-17
- Blockaid — KelpDAO DVN AnalysisBlockaid KelpDAO analysis: attack exploited DVN off-chain infrastructure, not ecrecover in adapter — confirms ecrecover is not the OFT vulnerability classretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether the bridge verifier code rejects `ecrecover` returns of `address(0)`.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →