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rubric v1.7.0

Bridge ecrecover checks result ≠ address(0)

A cross-chain & bridge factor in the v1.7.0 rubric. Measured per protocol on a s cadence.

Critical factor. A Red on this factor alone is sufficient to gate a protocol to grade D or F regardless of other category rollups.

Methodology how we score#

What this measures
This factor checks whether a bridge verifier explicitly tests that does not return . In Solidity, returns the zero address for invalid ECDSA signatures rather than reverting; a verifier that omits this check treats any malformed signature as belonging to . This factor applies only to bridge-touching protocols; non-bridge protocols show this factor as N/A.

Why it matters
If appears in a bridge guardian or signer set — as it did in Wormhole's original code — an attacker can forge a valid-looking signature for any message using malformed ECDSA inputs, enabling unbacked minting bounded only by destination liquidity. The Wormhole February 2022 exploit demonstrated how a single signer-set integrity flaw can threaten hundreds of millions in bridge TVL. Security auditors consistently flag a missing as high-severity precisely because the omission is visually unobtrusive: one missing line converts a cryptographically sound scheme into a no-authentication bypass.

Green / Yellow / Red
Green is scored when the verifier explicitly asserts across all verification paths. Yellow is scored when the check exists but applies only to a subset of paths or is delegated to a library whose zero-address handling cannot be confirmed. Red is scored when no zero-address assertion is present in any signature verification path.

Common gray cases
Gray is applied when the bridge verifier is closed-source or delegates to a third-party module whose implementation cannot be inspected.

Notable historical examples
No cross-hacked incidents are currently linked in the database for this factor.

★ Critical factor
This factor alone is sufficient to trigger a D or F grade under rubric v1.5. A missing check provides a direct path to arbitrary message forging and unbacked minting — one of the narrowest code-level omissions with the largest possible loss surface in bridge architecture.

Measurement what to look for#

Determine whether the bridge verifier code rejects `ecrecover` returns of `address(0)`.

Data & output #

Data source
Slither `ecrecover-malleable` detector + source inspection of bridge verifier on Etherscan-verified source
Output format
Green / Yellow / Red · critical gate active
Evidence artifact
Source excerpt of signature verification + `!= address(0)` check presence
Confidence signal
green = all ecrecover calls check for address(0); red = any ecrecover call does not check for address(0); gray = bridge source unverified

Scored protocols 0 carry this factor#

No protocols have been scored for this factor yet.

Linked hacks no historical incidents linked#

No historical incidents are linked to this factor.
rubric_version v1.7.0factor RD-F-151category 10carried 0critical yes