RD-F-007 red Bug bounty presence & max payout No public bug bounty program. Immunefi 404 confirmed (not anti-bot; this is a confirmed absence). Data cache bug_bounty.platform: null, url: null. $1.475B TVS with zero formal bug bounty incentive mechanism. Red per methodology threshold. RD-F-009 red Formal verification coverage No formal verification engagement found for USDD. CertiK and ChainSecurity audit pages do not mention Certora/Kani/Halmos proofs. No public GitHub repo to check for FV spec files. WebSearch for USDD formal verification returned no results. Red: 0% formal verification coverage. RD-F-183 red Bug bounty scope gap on highest-TVL contracts No bug bounty program exists at all (Immunefi 404 confirmed; data cache bug_bounty.platform: null). The highest-TVL contracts — TRON TRC-20 (TPYmHEhy5n8TCEfYGqW2rPxsghSfzghPDn, ~$1.364B) — have zero whitehatch incentive. Per taxonomy F183: red when highest-TVL contracts are out of scope; scored red (stronger adverse finding: no program at all, not just scope gap). $1.475B TVS with no public bug bounty program of any kind. RD-F-001 yellow Audit scope mismatch ChainSecurity completed ≥5 USDD audits (latest Oct 2025, 5th engagement, covering Ethereum/BSC). Canonical Ethereum ERC-20 (0x4f8e5de400de08b164e7421b3ee387f461becd1a) is source-verified on Etherscan (Solidity 0.6.12, Exact Match). Audit PDF is binary (not parseable for commit SHA). TRON primary (TPYmHEhy5n8TCEfYGqW2rPxsghSfzghPDn) Tronscan-blocked, source unverifiable. Cannot confirm bytecode-to-commit-SHA match at the primary audit source level. Yellow: audit coverage real and multi-round but commit-level verification structurally inaccessible. RD-F-003 yellow Resolved-without-proof findings ChainSecurity PSM audit page states 'Incorrect USDT Address has been resolved.' No other unresolved medium+ findings mentioned in accessible audit summaries. Full PDF is binary (not parseable); cannot verify all resolved findings have on-chain proof. Yellow: one confirmed resolution, others not independently verifiable from accessible sources. RD-F-005 yellow Audit firm tier ChainSecurity is Tier-2 (established, named firm with public track record). CertiK is Tier-2. Neither is Tier-1 (Trail of Bits / OpenZeppelin / ConsenSys Diligence / Certora / Sigma Prime / Spearbit / Zellic per taxonomy). Yellow: Tier-2 only, no Tier-1 firm engagement confirmed. RD-F-006 yellow Audit-to-deploy gap Native Ethereum USDD launched in September 2025 (The Block, Sep 2025). ChainSecurity 5th audit completed October 30, 2025 — approximately 60 days after deployment. The deployment preceded the covering audit by ~60 days. Yellow: code was live before the covering audit completed. RD-F-019 yellow ecrecover zero-address return unchecked Ethereum ERC-20 uses EIP-2612 permit() which calls ecrecover. Cannot confirm address(0) guard without tool run. Contract is ChainSecurity-audited (multiple rounds) which reduces risk; standard permit implementations of this era do check for address(0). Yellow: permit path uses ecrecover; audit coverage provides partial assurance but cannot confirm guard without tool run. TRON TVM: EVM-specific pattern not applicable. RD-F-008 gray Ignored bounty disclosure No prior contract exploit incidents identified (Rekt DB empty, data cache rekt.incidents: []). Three USDD incidents (June 2022 depeg, March 2023 depeg, August 2024 BTC reserve removal) are economic/governance events, not contract exploits with formal disclosure channels. With no bug bounty program, there is no formal disclosure channel to 'ignore.' Cannot assess ignored disclosure where no disclosure channel exists. RD-F-010 gray Static-analyzer high-severity count TRON primary contract: TVM substrate, not EVM-compatible, Slither/Mythril not applicable (not_applicable substrate). Ethereum ERC-20 (0x4f8e5de400de08b164e7421b3ee387f461becd1a): source-verified but Slither not run in this assessment. No published static analysis results in OSINT. Gray for the Ethereum portion; not_applicable for TRON substrate. RD-F-021 n/a UUPS _authorizeUpgrade correctly permissioned Ethereum ERC-20 is a standalone non-proxy contract (confirmed: no proxy pattern, no UUPS structure). UUPS _authorizeUpgrade factor is N/A for non-upgradeable contracts. TRON TVM: EVM-specific pattern not applicable. RD-F-023 n/a Constructor calls _disableInitializers() Ethereum ERC-20 is a standalone non-proxy contract. _disableInitializers() is an OZ pattern for proxied implementation contracts only. This contract uses a standard constructor with no proxy architecture. N/A. TRON TVM: EVM-specific OZ proxy pattern not applicable. RD-F-002 green Audit recency Most recent audit is ChainSecurity 5th engagement completed October 30, 2025. As of 2026-05-17, this is approximately 200 days — within the green threshold of ≤365 days.
RD-F-004 green Audit count Two distinct audit firms confirmed: ChainSecurity (≥5 engagements, 2022-2025) and CertiK (2022, AA rating on TRON ecosystem). Per methodology, ≥2 distinct firms = green.
RD-F-011 green SELFDESTRUCT reachable from non-admin path Ethereum ERC-20 source confirmed: simple ERC-20 with rely/deny and mint/burn. No SELFDESTRUCT opcode in this contract type. Confirmed via source inspection — functions are transfer/approve/mint/burn/permit only. TRON TVM: Slither not applicable, but TRON TRC-20 token contracts do not use SELFDESTRUCT by design. Green for assessable Ethereum surface.
RD-F-012 green delegatecall with user-controlled target Ethereum ERC-20 confirmed: no delegatecall. Standard ERC-20 with rely/deny access control. TRON TVM: EVM-specific pattern not applicable. Green for assessable Ethereum surface.
RD-F-013 green Arbitrary call with user-controlled target Ethereum ERC-20 confirmed: pure token contract (transfer/approve/permit/mint/burn); no arbitrary external call with user-controlled target. TRON TVM: EVM-specific pattern not applicable. Green.
RD-F-014 green Reentrancy guard on external-calling functions Ethereum ERC-20: simple token with no external calls in state-mutating functions. Rely/deny-controlled mint/burn does not call external contracts. No reentrancy surface. TRON TVM: EVM-specific pattern not applicable. Green.
RD-F-015 green ERC-777/1155/721 hook without reentrancy guard Ethereum ERC-20: Standard ERC-20; no ERC-777/1155/721 integration and no tokensReceived/onReceived hooks. TRON TVM: EVM-specific pattern not applicable. Green.
RD-F-016 green Divide-before-multiply pattern Ethereum ERC-20: simple add/sub arithmetic wrappers only; no complex divide-before-multiply in price-accounting paths. Pure token contract with no AMM or price math. TRON TVM: not applicable. Green.
RD-F-017 green Mixed-decimals math without explicit scaling Ethereum ERC-20: pure token with 18 decimals; no cross-token math requiring decimal normalization. TRON TVM: not applicable. Green.
RD-F-018 green Signed/unsigned arithmetic confusion Ethereum ERC-20: SafeMath-style add/sub (overflow-protected). No signed/unsigned conversion confusion in a simple ERC-20 token. TRON TVM: not applicable. Green.
RD-F-020 green EIP-712 domain separator missing chainId Ethereum ERC-20 constructor explicitly takes chainId_ parameter for EIP-712 domain separation, including chainId. This prevents cross-chain replay. TRON TVM: EVM-specific EIP-712 pattern not applicable. Green.
RD-F-022 green Public initialize() without initializer modifier Ethereum canonical ERC-20 confirmed via Etherscan source: standard constructor with chainId_ parameter; no initialize() function present; not a proxied upgradeable contract. No initializer modifier needed. TRON TVM: proxy upgrade pattern not assessable but TRC-20 tokens do not typically use proxy-initializer patterns. Green for assessable Ethereum surface.
RD-F-024 green Code complexity vs audit coverage Ethereum ERC-20 is a single-file simple token contract (~200 LOC, low cyclomatic complexity). ChainSecurity has audited ≥5 rounds over 2022-2025. Audit coverage is clearly adequate for this code size. TRON primary audited by CertiK 2022 + ChainSecurity multiple rounds. Green: multiple rounds by two firms for a low-complexity codebase.