Quorum achievable via single-entity flash loan
Liquity V1 + V2 (LUSD / BOLD)'s assessment for RD-F-037 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Flash-loan quorum attack is structurally impossible. New staked LQTY = 0 voting power; flash-borrowed LQTY cannot participate in current or prior epoch snapshots. Dynamic voting threshold = 2% of prior epoch total votes, computed from prior-epoch snapshots that exclude same-block positions.
Sources #
- DocsLiquity v2 FAQ — LQTY StakingLiquity v2 LQTY Staking: voting power accrual requires staking age; flash loans cannot meet time requirementretrieved 2026-05-16
- Liquity V2-gov GitHub RepositoryV2-gov README: calculateVotingThreshold() uses prior epoch snapshot — quorum computation based on historical data, not live balanceretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the governance quorum threshold is ≤ the largest available flash-loan notional in the governance token at reference DEX depth.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol liquity factor RD-F-037 score green collected_at 2026-05-16 10:35:50