Large governance proposal queued
Yearn Finance's assessment for RD-F-101 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Large governance proposal execution queued. Snapshot veyfi.eth uses veYFI locked vote-escrow mechanism (Curve veCRV-class — not flash-loanable). No malicious-pattern governance proposal detected in Snapshot veyfi.eth as of 2026-05-16. ychad 6-of-9 multisig serves as guardian (can nullify proposals). TimelockController minDelay conflict (cache 604800s vs Etherscan 0) is a governance-admin Cat 2 concern; Cat 6 signal fires on actively queued malicious-pattern proposals, not on the timelock delay value itself. No flagged-pattern proposal queued today.
Sources #
- DocsYearn docs — veYFI introductionYearn docs: 'veYFI is vote-escrow / locked (Curve veCRV-class, NOT flash-loanable).' ychad functions as Protocol Guardian with nullification power.retrieved 2026-05-16
- Snapshot — veyfi.eth governance spaceSnapshot veyfi.eth: no active malicious-pattern proposals identified as of 2026-05-16. veYFI vote-escrow mechanism: locked token, not flash-loanable.retrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect whether a governance proposal with potentially protocol-impactful payload has been queued for execution (including Security-Council threshold-reduction variant).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →