First-depositor / share-inflation guard
Venus Protocol's assessment for RD-F-075 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Three layers to assess: (1) ERC-4626 vaults — OZ 4.9.3 provides first-depositor guard via virtual-share offset if properly inherited (see RD-F-074; unconfirmed from docs alone). (2) Isolated Pool vToken markets — initialSupply seed deposit required at market listing (partial guard). (3) Core Pool vToken markets — the March 2026 exploit demonstrated the first-depositor guard is insufficient for active markets: donation attack effective on market with 12.2M tokens of genuine supply by inflating exchange rate via direct transfer. The internalCash patch (VIPs 600–602) is the intended fix, but is unconfirmed as fully deployed, and vBNB is immutable/unpatched. Residual: the active-market donation pathway is the exploited surface; the first-depositor empty-market guard does not address it for markets with existing depositors. Score: yellow (partial guard present, active-market pathway remains exposed in vBNB).
Sources #
- URLVenus Thena Donation Attack — BlockSecBlockSec Thena analysis — donation attack on active market with 12.2M existing depositsretrieved 2026-04-28
- Multi-chain Patch Fix — Venus GovernanceVenus Community — multi-chain patch VIP 600–602 (internalCash fix) and vBNB immutability gapretrieved 2026-04-28
- VenusProtocol isolated-pools — GitHubVenusProtocol/isolated-pools — initialSupply parameter in AddMarketInput struct (seed deposit guard)retrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Determine whether the vault has a first-depositor guard (seed deposit on deploy, virtual-share offset, or floor-check).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →