★ delegatecall/call in proposal execution without allowlist

Veda (BoringVault)'s assessment for RD-F-039 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No on-chain Governor or proposal execution path. The BoringVault manage() uses call() constrained by Merkle verification — this is a code-security concern (Cat 1), not a governance-execution concern. Not applicable for the governance-executor pattern.

Sources #

GitHub
ManagerWithMerkleVerification — Merkle-constrained call dispatchManagerWithMerkleVerification.sol: manageVaultWithMerkleVerification() uses Merkle-verified call dispatch, not open delegatecallretrieved 2026-05-17

Methodology #

Determine whether the governance executor contract uses `delegatecall` or `call` with proposal-supplied target, without enforcing an allowlist of permitted targets.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol veda factor RD-F-039 score not_applicable collected_at 2026-05-17 12:41:22