Abnormal gas-price willingness from attacker wallet
Uniswap (v2 + v3)'s assessment for RD-F-093 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
V2+V3 combined: V2 and V3 are not oracle-reading protocols — MEV attack races (gas-price willingness) targeting oracle manipulation are structurally inapplicable to the core AMM. MEV arbitrage bots routinely pay elevated gas for Uniswap swaps; this is expected normal operation, not an attack signal. Requires live mempool monitoring not available in static assessment.
Detail #
Signal fires when a wallet pays >= 5x median gas priority fee AND interacts with protocol core contracts in a way consistent with oracle manipulation or governance takeover. V2 and V3 do not consume any external oracle — there is no oracle-manipulation profit path against these contracts. High gas for V2/V3 is routine arbitrage MEV, not attack-class behavior. Gray per methodology: mempool monitoring not configured in static assessment.
Sources #
- DocsT-09 Real-Time Signals — RD-F-093 structural mismatch for UniswapT-09 v1 signal scope — RD-F-093 is v1-deferred (P2); structurally inapplicable for non-oracle-consuming AMMsretrieved 2026-05-12
Methodology #
Detect whether a wallet pays ≥5× median gas priority fee (indicating MEV race or urgency), interacting with this protocol.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →