★ Flash-loanable voting weight
Uniswap (v2 + v3)'s assessment for RD-F-036 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
V2: not applicable (no governance). V3: UNI uses checkpoint-based voting via getPriorVotes() at proposal.startBlock. Flash-loan-acquired UNI cannot influence a vote as checkpoint block precedes any flash loan. Beanstalk-class risk does not apply. Combined: green.
Detail #
UNI token 0x1f9840a8: checkpoints mapping and getPriorVotes() function confirmed in Etherscan verified source. GovernorBravoDelegate: vote power recorded at proposal.startBlock — any UNI flash-loaned after proposal creation has no effect on outstanding vote tallies. To attack governance via flash loan, an attacker would need to have held UNI at the proposal-creation block, which makes flash loans irrelevant.
Sources #
- GitHubGovernorBravoDelegate sourceGovernorBravoDelegate: vote power recorded at proposal.startBlockretrieved 2026-04-29
- UNI token contract sourceUNI token: checkpoints mapping and getPriorVotes() function confirmedretrieved 2026-04-29
Methodology #
Determine whether governance voting power is a function of current token balance of a transferable token with no lock or checkpoint, making it flash-loan susceptible.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →