Role separation: upgrade ≠ fee ≠ oracle
Superstate's assessment for RD-F-035 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
All privileged functions - mint, adminBurn, setOracle, setRedemptionContract, setStablecoinConfig, upgrade - are controlled by a single owner address per token (0xad309BB6... for USTB, 0x8abC89D9... for USCC). No role separation exists. Ownable2StepUpgradeable pattern is used without AccessControl multi-role. renounceOwnership() is explicitly reverted in the contract, preventing any future role removal.
Sources #
- GitHubSuperstateToken.sol - Single Owner RoleSuperstateToken.sol: all admin functions use _checkOwner(); Ownable2StepUpgradeable; renounceOwnership() reverts; no AccessControl or role separationretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the upgrade role, fee-collection role, and oracle-config role are assigned to distinct addresses.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol superstate factor RD-F-035 score red collected_at 2026-05-16 00:06:37