Avg attacker reconnaissance time for peer-class protocols
StakeWise v3's assessment for RD-F-163 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No same-class LST protocol exploit reconnaissance baseline available from hacksdatabase (StakeWise-class vault-factory LST is novel). The Balancer-adjacent 2025-11 event was a Balancer v2 vulnerability, not a direct StakeWise reconnaissance-then-strike event. Peer-class reconnaissance baseline (e.g., typical reconnaissance duration for ETH-staking LSTs) requires curator research across comparable protocols. Cannot populate without curator input.
Sources #
- Internal00-profile.md sec.10 - 2025-11-03 incident was Balancer v2 bug, not StakeWise reconnaissance-then-strike; no reconnaissance pattern applicableretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Report the average number of days of attacker reconnaissance activity before a strike on peer-class protocols (lending/DEX/bridge/perps), sourced from the hack database.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →