Admin/upgrade transaction in mempool
StakeWise v3's assessment for RD-F-102 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Signal applicable and elevated. The 4-of-7 DAO Safe (0x144a98cb…) can execute any admin action — setController on osETH, addOracles/removeOracles on Keeper (0x6B5815…), upgradeTo on VaultFactory proxy (0x7A8cbBf…) — without any on-chain timelock. The T-09 suppression rule (tx originates from timelock contract fed by queued governance proposal) cannot engage because no on-chain timelock exists (governance.timelock_address: null per cache). The only suppression path is a curator-maintained Snapshot proposal allowlist. No admin tx currently in mempool at assessment date. However, the structural posture is persistently elevated: any unannounced 4-of-7 Safe execution would fire this signal immediately. The 2025-11-03 emergency burn/mint demonstrates willingness to act without on-chain pre-announcement queue.
Sources #
- EtherscanStakeWise DAO Treasury Safe — EtherscanDAO Safe 0x144a98cb1CdBb23610501fE6108858D9B7D24934 — 4-of-7 multisig; Gnosis Safe proxy; no timelock between Safe execution and effectretrieved 2026-05-16
- 00-data-cache.json governance.timelock_address: null - confirmed no on-chain timelock; suppression rule cannot engageretrieved 2026-05-16
- DL News — Balancer/StakeWise emergency actionDL News — emergency multisig invoked 2025-11-03; first use; no on-chain pre-announcement before executionretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect an admin-role or upgrade transaction appearing in the mempool before confirmation.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →