★ Empty cToken-style market (zero supply/borrow)
StakeWise v3's assessment for RD-F-070 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
[STAR CRITICAL — assessed as yellow] StakeWise v3 Vaults are NOT Compound V2 lending forks. The classic empty-cToken-market pattern does not apply directly. However, the structurally analogous share-inflation risk applies to the vault-share model. VaultState.sol source confirms: convertToShares() returns 1:1 when totalShares_==0, no MINIMUM_SHARES constant, no virtual-share offset, no explicit seed-deposit requirement. VaultEnterExit.sol shows no dead-shares mechanism. VaultOsToken.sol shows no first-depositor guard. Risk is materially bounded by: (1) osETH minting at 90% LTV — an attacker manipulating empty-vault share price would also need to corrupt the osETH mint path against over-collateralised backing; (2) permissionless vaults start empty with zero depositors, limiting blast radius; (3) six independent audit engagements (Halborn x2, Sigma Prime x3, Consensys Diligence, Hats Finance, ABDK, Statemind through 2026-04-20) reviewed vault architecture without flagging a share-inflatio
Sources #
- GitHubVaultEnterExit.sol source — deposit logicstakewise/v3-core VaultEnterExit.sol — _deposit function lacks seed deposit or dead-shares mechanismretrieved 2026-05-16
- StakeWise v3-core audits indexstakewise/v3-core audits directory — 8 audits covering vault architectureretrieved 2026-05-16
- LlamaRisk osETH Collateral Assessment 2024LlamaRisk osETH assessment — over-collateralisation mechanism descriptionretrieved 2026-05-16
- VaultState.sol source — share conversion logicstakewise/v3-core VaultState.sol — convertToShares returns 1:1 at zero state; no virtual offsetretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether any listed Compound V2-fork market has `totalSupply == 0` and `totalBorrow == 0`, the precondition for a donation-exploit.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →