Avg attacker reconnaissance time for peer-class protocols
Stake DAO's assessment for RD-F-163 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Class-level statistic (methodology template §12 note: present as contextual note, not per-protocol flag). Curve/DeFi ecosystem vote-aggregator protocols: Zunami-class price manipulation attacks involved rapid same-session execution (not prolonged reconnaissance). USPD 78-day reconnaissance pattern applies more to DPRK-class targeted attacks on bridge protocols. Stake DAO's current threat surface (vote aggregator, no large user-facing bridge) is less attractive for nation-state long-term reconnaissance than bridge or perpetuals protocols. Curator input required to translate class-level statistic into a protocol-specific risk posture.
Sources #
- InternalMethodology template.md Cat 11 guidanceMethodology template §12 — RD-F-163 is a class-level statistic from hack DB, not a per-protocol flag; requires curator to contextualizeretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Report the average number of days of attacker reconnaissance activity before a strike on peer-class protocols (lending/DEX/bridge/perps), sourced from the hack database.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →