Flash loan >$10M targeting protocol tokens
Stake DAO's assessment for RD-F-100 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
T-09 phase-2 signal (tier-B, grade-eligible only when corroborated). vlSDT uses a vote-escrow lock pattern (non-transferable; checkpointed balances per SDGP-66); flash-loan governance attack is structurally blocked — flash-loaned SDT cannot be converted to vlSDT voting power within a single transaction. Beanstalk-class instantaneous governance exploit is not replicable against Stake DAO's vlSDT system. No flash loan >$10M targeting SDT or sdToken contracts from Aave/Uniswap/Balancer flash loan providers detected touching Stake DAO oracle or governor in public data. Signal not firing today.
Sources #
- GovernanceSDGP-66: Updated Governance Framework for vlSDT | Stake DAO GovernanceSDGP-66 — vlSDT uses checkpointed balances; 1 vlSDT = 1 vote; flash-loan-acquired power not recognized (reliance on snapshot checkpoints)retrieved 2026-05-16
- vlSDT | EtherscanvlSDT contract 0x94818A7baa7e9F5dC62ce4da1B52ef9a760b80B8 — vote-locked, non-transferable per Etherscan inspectionretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect whether a flash loan >$10M denominated in protocol tokens or LP tokens has originated, likely to interact with this protocol.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →