Dependency graph (protocols depended upon)
Stake DAO's assessment for RD-F-050 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Existential, non-redundant runtime dependency on four non-upgradeable Curve core contracts: GaugeController (0x2F50D538606Fa9EDD2B11E2446BEb18C9D5846bB) for gauge vote execution, VotingEscrow (0x5f3b5DfEb7B28CDbD7FAba78963EE202a494e2A2) for veCRV lock management, Minter (0xd061D61a4d941c39E5453435B6345Dc261C2fcE0) for CRV reward harvesting, FeeDistributor (0xD16d5eC345Dd86Fb63C6a9C43c517210F1027914) for 3CRV fee claims. CurveStrategy.sol calls IMinter(MINTER).mint_for() with MINTER as an immutable field; VoterBase.sol calls IGaugeController.vote_for_gauge_weights(). If Curve deprecates or migrates any of these contracts, Stake DAO's core value proposition (boosted veCRV delegation) halts with no in-protocol fallback. Additionally dependent on Balancer/Frax/Pendle veToken contracts for respective lockers, and Convex Booster for optional strategy boost routing. Red: critical non-redundant dependency with no fallback on non-upgradeable external protocol.
Sources #
- InternalProfile §7 external dependencies.research/protocols/stake-dao/00-profile.md §7 — external contracts called: Curve GaugeController, VotingEscrow, Minter, FeeDistributor; Convex Booster; Morpho Blueretrieved 2026-05-16
- CurveStrategy.sol — Minter dependencypackages/strategies/src/integrations/curve/CurveStrategy.sol — IMinter(MINTER).mint_for(gauge, address(LOCKER)); MINTER is immutableretrieved 2026-05-16
- CurveEthereum address book — external dependency addressespackages/address-book/src/CurveEthereum.sol — GaugeController=0x2F50D538..., VotingEscrow=0x5f3b5DfE..., Minter=0xd061D61a...retrieved 2026-05-16
- VoterBase.sol — GaugeController dependencypackages/lockers/src/VoterBase.sol — IGaugeController.vote_for_gauge_weights via _executeTransaction(_getController(), voteData)retrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
List all external protocols whose failure would directly impair this protocol (LST providers, bridges, stablecoin issuers, keepers).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →