defirisk.co
rubric v1.7.0

Timelock on sensitive actions

Stake DAO's assessment for RD-F-033 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

Timelock exists and admin is governance multisig. executeTransaction() routes through 8h delay. No emergency/rescue path in timelock source. PROXY_ADMIN owner unconfirmed — if not routed through timelock, upgrades may bypass delay. Partial coverage: 3/5 sensitive action types appear timelocked; oracle-config and PROXY_ADMIN upgrade paths unconfirmed.

Sources #

  • Etherscan
    Stake DAO Timelock — SourceTimelock source: queueTransaction/executeTransaction pattern; no emergency/rescue functions; admin = governance multisigretrieved 2026-05-16
  • Etherscan
    Stake DAO PROXY_ADMINPROXY_ADMIN contract — owner unconfirmed; controls transparent proxy upgradesretrieved 2026-05-16

Methodology #

For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol stake-dao factor RD-F-033 score yellow collected_at 2026-05-16 12:29:20