Role separation: upgrade ≠ fee ≠ oracle

QuickSwap's assessment for RD-F-035 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No role separation across upgrade, fee, oracle, or operational functions. V3 AlgebraFactory single owner controls setOwner, setFarmingAddress, setVaultAddress, setBaseFeeConfiguration. V2 Factory feeToSetter (deployer EOA) controls all fee functions. QuickSwap DEX has no oracle (no F035 oracle-role dimension), but fee, vault, and farming powers are all collapsed into a single role.

Sources #

Etherscan
V2 Factory readContract — feeToSetterV2 Factory feeToSetter=deployer EOA controls all V2 fee functions unilaterallyretrieved 2026-05-16
GitHub
AlgebraFactory — single role for all admin powersAlgebraFactory source shows all admin functions use onlyOwner modifier — no role separationretrieved 2026-05-16

Methodology #

Determine whether the upgrade role, fee-collection role, and oracle-config role are assigned to distinct addresses.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol quickswap factor RD-F-035 score red collected_at 2026-05-16 08:48:31