Avg attacker reconnaissance time for peer-class protocols
Pendle Finance's assessment for RD-F-163 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Attacker reconnaissance time for peer-class protocols (Cat 11). Definition: avg days of reconnaissance by attacker-labeled wallets before strike on yield-tokenization class protocols. Penpie's attack appeared to be a rapid opportunistic exploit (no extended reconnaissance trail identified on Pendle or Penpie core). USPD 78-day class is DPRK-specific (no DPRK attribution here). Yield-tokenization class is newer — insufficient peer-class hack DB data for a robust reconnaissance-time distribution. Curator annotation only.
Sources #
- Curator noteExplained: The Penpie Hack | HalbornInsufficient peer-class data for yield-tokenization; Penpie exploit appears rapid/opportunistic; no 78-day reconnaissance identifiedretrieved 2026-04-29
Methodology #
Report the average number of days of attacker reconnaissance activity before a strike on peer-class protocols (lending/DEX/bridge/perps), sourced from the hack database.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →