Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
Ondo Finance's assessment for RD-F-073 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
OUSG cannot be borrowed (collateral-only). Stablecoin markets (USDC, DAI) use Chainlink oracle feeds (confirmed in data cache: USDC/USD at 0x8fFfFfd4AfB6115b954Bd326cbe7B4BA576818f6, USDT/USD at 0x3E7d1eAB13ad0104d2750B8863b489D65364e32D). Chainlink feed deviation threshold for USDC is 0.25%, heartbeat 82,800s (~23h). For OUSG collateral: the custom NAV Pricer is a trusted EOA posting daily prices — this is a centralized oracle, not manipulable via DEX pool depth but vulnerable to admin key c...
Sources #
- Curator noteExtracted from 04-economic.md — RD-F-073 finding; no URL cited in originalretrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →