Fallback behavior on oracle failure
Ondo Finance's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
**No on-chain fallback for OUSG/USDY oracles.** If Pricer.sol becomes unavailable or posts zero/stale value, OUSG minting reverts. If RWADynamicOracle is paused, USDY minting reverts. No secondary price source configured. For Flux Finance Chainlink feeds: Compound v2 fork pattern — no fallback, operations revert on stale/zero oracle. Chainalysis oracle: reverts if unavailable, blocking USDY minting entirely.
Sources #
- EtherscanRWADynamicOracle (verified: 'Ondo Finance: USDY Price Oracle')https://etherscan.io/address/0xa0219aa5b31e65bc920b5b6dfb8edf0988121de0retrieved 2026-05-12
- OUSG_InstantManager (verified: 'Ondo Finance: OUSG Instant Manager 2')https://etherscan.io/address/0x93358db73B6cd4b98D89c8F5f230E81a95c2643aretrieved 2026-05-12
Methodology #
Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →