Admin/upgrade transaction in mempool
Multipli's assessment for RD-F-102 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Applicable: MultipliBridger owner EOA (0x151799d9… partial, profile §7) and RolesAuthority vault admins are on-chain admin surfaces. UUPS proxied vaults (ERC-4626Upgradeable) have upgrade functions. T-09 phase-2 signal, Tier-B. No admin/upgrade tx in mempool reported via public channels. No large-scale admin action flagged in Rekt/DeFiLlama. Deployer address (0x8cFee31b…) shows routine admin role-management txns (Set User Role, Set Role Capability) consistent with normal operational activity — not anomalous per threshold definition.
Sources #
- TxMultipli vault deployer — Snowtrace transaction historySnowtrace deployer 0x8cFee31bf3A57EC2C86D9e0f476Bd36aCA611Fa5 — Set User Role, Set Role Capability txns visible; no anomalous upgrade txretrieved 2026-05-17
- Multipli data cache — no exploit/attacker history.research/protocols/multipli/00-data-cache.json §sources.rekt.incidents=[]retrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Detect an admin-role or upgrade transaction appearing in the mempool before confirmation.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →