Fallback behavior on oracle failure
Multipli's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
xToken vaults: no documented fallback when ORACLE role holder stops pushing balance updates; PPS circuit breaker only triggers on movement not freeze. rwaUSD: explicit fail-closed — STALE: issuance disabled; DISPUTED: issuance disabled; HALTED: risk-reducing ops only. No multi-oracle fallback chain. Fail-closed design for rwaUSD is well-documented; absence of fallback for xToken is confirmed by source review.
Sources #
- GitHubMultipliVault.sol — oracle fallback absenceMultipliVault.sol — maxPercentageChange PPS circuit breaker; no staleness fallback in onUnderlyingBalanceUpdateretrieved 2026-05-17
- Multipli docs full corpus — oracle price status semanticsdocs llms-full.txt — price statuses OK/STALE/DISPUTED/HALTED and their operational implicationsretrieved 2026-05-17
- Multipli governance and emergency controlsdocs governance-and-emergency-controls — wind-down mode can freeze prices at last-known-good valuesretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →