Arbitrary call with user-controlled target

Multipli's assessment for RD-F-013 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

manage() calls external targets but validates both caller and target via authority().canCall(msg.sender, target, functionSig) through RolesAuthority. Per-target, per-function-selector allowlist enforced. Unauthorized combinations revert with TargetMethodNotAuthorized. Not an unconstrained arbitrary call.

Sources #

Etherscan
MultipliVault implementation — manage() with target allowlist via RolesAuthoritySnowtrace — MultipliVault impl manage() with canCall validationretrieved 2026-05-17

Methodology #

Determine whether any contract performs `.call(target, data)` where target and/or data is user-supplied without a target allowlist or selector filter.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol multipli factor RD-F-013 score green collected_at 2026-05-17 11:48:35