Bridge validator count (M)
Midas's assessment for RD-F-148 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Two distinct bridge mechanisms: (1) LayerZero OFT: messages authenticated via DVN (Decentralized Verifier Network) attestation on the OFT adapter — DVNs attest to packet hashes; executor delivers. DVN count/composition unknown (OFT adapter address not identified). (2) Axelar ITS: messages authenticated via Axelar's proof-of-stake validator set (~75 validators) through the Axelar gateway's approveMessages() function. The mTBILL token (OZ ERC-20, no LZ inheritance) uses a separate OFT adapter for cross-chain locking/minting. No custom signature verification outside these frameworks confirmed.
Sources #
- URLAxelar Interchain Token Service DocumentationAxelar ITS documentation: approveMessages() via PoS validator set; ITS address 0xB5FB4BE02232B1bBA4dC8f81dc24C26980dE9e3Cretrieved 2026-05-16
- mTBILL Token — EtherscanmTBILL token 0xDD629E5241CbC5919847783e6C96B2De4754e438 source: OZ ERC-20 only, no LayerZero OFT inheritance — confirms separate OFT adapter patternretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Count the number of distinct validators or signers in the bridge's signer set (for non-LZ bridges; use F179 for LayerZero OFT).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →