Bridge signer-set change proposed/executed

Evidence summary #

Bridge signer-set change signal. T-09 v1 launch / Tier A (instant grade flip). Applicable: Midas has confirmed LayerZero OFT and Axelar vault bridge surface per bug bounty scope (2026-03-24) which explicitly lists 'Layer Zero OFT, Axelar vault' as in-scope contracts. Confirmed active usage: Midas paused and resumed its LayerZero OFT service on 2026-04-19 in response to the KelpDAO rsETH exploit ($292M, Lazarus Group attack on LayerZero 1/1 DVN). Current posture: pipeline config has layerzero_oapp_address: null — specific OFT adapter addresses not registered; signal cannot fire. For Axelar: uses DPoS validator set (top-75 by AXL stake), not a static k-of-N signer multisig; validator elections use different event structure requiring separate monitoring logic. No bridge contract events monitored. Yellow because: this is a T-09 v1 Tier-A grade-flipping signal for a confirmed active bridge surface, but the pipeline is not wired due to missing contract address registration. The monitoring ga

Sources #

Methodology #

Detect whether a bridge validator or signer-set change has been proposed or executed.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →