Oracle price deviation >X% from secondary
mETH Protocol's assessment for RD-F-099 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Oracle price deviation >X% from secondary source. T-09 v1, Phase 2. mETH uses a custom committee oracle (OracleQuorumManager at 0x92e56d2146D54d5AEcB25CA36c89D027a6ea0D90) that reports ETH validator-accounting balances — not a Chainlink spot feed or DEX price. The T-09 secondary-source cross-check architecture does not directly apply to a committee-based validator-accounting oracle. The LiquidityBuffer via Aave v3 may consume Chainlink indirectly but this path is not mapped. Gray: signal architecture mismatch for core oracle; partial applicability via LiquidityBuffer not yet established.
Sources #
- DocsmETH Protocol smart contracts documentationmETH Protocol smart contracts docs — OracleQuorumManager at 0x92e56d2146D54d5AEcB25CA36c89D027a6ea0D90 is a committee-based validator-accounting oracle, not a Chainlink spot feedretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect whether the primary oracle's reported price deviates >X% from the best available secondary source (another feed or venue).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →