Circuit breaker on price deviation
Marinade Finance's assessment for RD-F-057 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No price-deviation circuit breaker identified for the mSOL exchange rate. The rate can only change by epoch rewards (monotonically increasing absent a slash), so manipulation is not a realistic attack vector via this path. However, no on-chain guard against anomalous lamport totals or update_price crank exploitation is documented. The 2023 upgrade added an emergency pause feature (audited by Neodyme/Sec3), which guards against program-level attack but is not specifically a price-deviation circuit breaker. Yellow rather than red because the oracle model (stake lamport state) has a natural upper bound on rate change per epoch.
Sources #
- DocsMarinade security documentationMarinade security page: emergency pause added; no price-deviation circuit breaker documentedretrieved 2026-05-16
- Neodyme 2023 audit of Marinade liquid staking programNeodyme 2023 audit: emergency pause feature added in 2023 upgrade; scope included redelegate and emergency pauseretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol halts or reverts if the oracle-reported price deviates by more than X% from a reference within Y blocks.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →