Reentrancy guard on external-calling functions
M^0's assessment for RD-F-014 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
MinterGateway uses CEI pattern — state mutations (delete _mintProposals[msg.sender]) precede external calls (IMToken.mint()). No explicit nonReentrant modifier but CEI is correct pattern. ERC-20 transfers do not use attacker-controlled callbacks. Covered by Certora FV and Prototech invariant tests.
Sources #
- GitHub
- Prototech Labs Audit ReportPrototech Labs audit — invariant suite covering reentrancyretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether all state-mutating functions that perform external calls carry `nonReentrant` or an equivalent reentrancy guard.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol m0 factor RD-F-014 score green collected_at 2026-05-16 09:46:19