Large governance proposal queued
Liquity V1 + V2 (LUSD / BOLD)'s assessment for RD-F-101 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Large governance proposal execution queued malicious-pattern flagged signal (T-09 v1 launch, tier-B). Applicable with very limited scope. v2 Governance contract 0x807def5e7d057df05c796f4bc75c3fe82bd6eee1 handles PIL incentive direction only via initiative registration and vote allocation. Threshold fires on calldata targeting admin-role-change, upgradeTo, delegatecall, or flash-loanable-weight proposer. Current posture: no such calldata patterns are valid in Liquity's governance — core contracts are immutable (no upgrade selectors exist as valid targets); PIL proposals only route 25% of protocol revenue to initiatives, they cannot modify admin roles or upgrade contracts. Weekly epoch-based voting; no malicious-pattern proposals identified. Signal would NOT fire today.
Sources #
- GitHubLiquity V2-gov GitHub repositoryLiquity V2-gov repository: governance implementation limited to PIL incentive direction; no upgrade or core-contract modification powerretrieved 2026-05-16
- LQTY Staking & Voting — Liquity DocsLiquity v2 governance: PIL direction only, no upgrade or admin-change authority; confirmed at docs.liquity.orgretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect whether a governance proposal with potentially protocol-impactful payload has been queued for execution (including Security-Council threshold-reduction variant).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →