First-depositor / share-inflation guard
Liquity V1 + V2 (LUSD / BOLD)'s assessment for RD-F-075 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
First-depositor / share-inflation guard is not applicable. Liquity does not use a share-based accounting model susceptible to first-depositor inflation. Each Trove is an individual CDP with isolated accounting. The v1 Stability Pool uses an epoch+scale mechanism (not a simple share model) that prevents manipulation via direct LUSD donation. v2 Stability Pools use analogous architecture. The classic share-inflation attack (vault receives donation, first depositor's share diluted or inflated) does not apply to Liquity's architecture.
Sources #
- URLLiquity v1 FAQ — Stability Pool and Liquidationsv1 Stability Pool: epoch+scale mechanism prevents reward manipulation via direct LUSD transferretrieved 2026-05-16
- Liquity v2 bold GitHub repositoryv2 Stability Pools: per-branch design with analogous anti-manipulation architectureretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the vault has a first-depositor guard (seed deposit on deploy, virtual-share offset, or floor-check).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →