Oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap
Liquity V1 + V2 (LUSD / BOLD)'s assessment for RD-F-073 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No explicit per-asset USD borrow cap found in documentation or contract reads. v2 uses dynamic TCR-based limits (debt creation pauses at CCR; market shuts down at SCR). v1 has no explicit borrow cap; minting is bounded by collateral supplied at MCR. Oracle-manipulation resistance comes from Chainlink with fallback (v1: Tellor; v2: composite per-branch) and oracle-staleness shutdown (e.g. 48h staleness triggers market shutdown). These mechanisms provide partial mitigation but are not equivalent to a static oracle-manipulation-proof borrow cap. Yellow: controls exist but are dynamic/implicit rather than explicit static caps.
Sources #
- URLLiquity v2 FAQ — Borrowing and Liquidationsv2 per-branch oracle: WETH uses Chainlink ETH/USD; wstETH/rETH use composite Chainlink feedsretrieved 2026-05-16
- Liquity v2 Risk DisclosureCCR triggers debt creation pause; SCR triggers market shutdown; oracle staleness (48h rETH) triggers shutdownretrieved 2026-05-16
- Liquity v1 FAQ — Borrowingv1 borrowing mechanics: no explicit borrow cap; bounded by 110% MCR and collateral suppliedretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the per-asset borrow cap is ≤ (oracle pool depth × manipulation-resistance multiplier).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →