First-depositor / share-inflation guard
Liquid Collective (LsETH)'s assessment for RD-F-075 — scored not_applicable on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No first-depositor share-inflation attack surface exists. River is not a share-based vault (not ERC-4626, not a per-market share token). The conversion rate starts at 1 and increases monotonically as rewards accrue; it is set by the internal quorum oracle report (totalETHSupply / totalLsETHSupply), not by raw asset balance. There is no mechanism by which an early depositor could donate ETH to inflate shares against later depositors. Multiple Spearbit audits (2022-2023) reviewed the core exchange-rate accounting logic. Per PD-024, share-vault-specific factors are not_applicable for non-share-vault LST protocols.
Sources #
- DocsLiquid Collective — LsETH tokenomics (conversion rate mechanism)LsETH tokenomics: conversion rate starts at 1, increases monotonically with rewards; oracle-report-driven, not balance-drivenretrieved 2026-05-17
- Spearbit/Cantina May 2023 Security Review — LsETH accountingSpearbit March 2023 review — covers LsETH redemptions and validator withdrawals; Spearbit May 2023 (via Cantina) — covers Oracle reporting, LsETH redemption behavior; no share-inflation finding raised across any reviewretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether the vault has a first-depositor guard (seed deposit on deploy, virtual-share offset, or floor-check).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →