Circuit breaker on price deviation
Liquid Collective (LsETH)'s assessment for RD-F-057 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No circuit breaker on oracle-reported conversion rate deviation. Oracle.1.sol source contains no maxDeviationBps, priceGuard, or rate-change halt mechanism. River.1.sol contains no rate-change circuit breaker. If a quorum of Oracle Operators submit a materially false report (e.g., inflated validator balances), there is no on-chain mechanism to detect or halt the resulting mispricing of LsETH. The quorum requirement (multiple operators must agree) is a social deterrent but not a technical circuit breaker.
Sources #
- GitHubLiquid Collective Oracle.1.sol sourceOracle.1.sol — no maxDeviationBps, no priceGuard, no secondary-source cross-check in sourceretrieved 2026-05-17
- Liquid Collective River.1.sol sourceRiver.1.sol — no rate-change circuit breaker in _onEarnings or elsewhereretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol halts or reverts if the oracle-reported price deviates by more than X% from a reference within Y blocks.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →