★ Rescue/emergencyWithdraw without timelock
Kinetiq's assessment for RD-F-041 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
rescueToken() (TREASURY_ROLE) and executeEmergencyWithdrawal() (SENTINEL_ROLE) exist in StakingManager with no timelock. Both execute immediately upon role authorization. No OZ TimelockController anywhere in the protocol. TREASURY_ROLE and SENTINEL_ROLE holders are unidentified addresses. A compromised or malicious role-holder can drain funds in one transaction.
Sources #
- EtherscanStakingManager on HyperEVMScan (no timelock in architecture)No timelock contract found on HyperEVMScan; timelock_address=null in data cacheretrieved 2026-05-17
- StakingManager.sol source (Code4rena) — rescue functionsStakingManager.sol: rescueToken() only callable by TREASURY_ROLE (immediate); executeEmergencyWithdrawal() only callable by SENTINEL_ROLE (immediate); no timelock check on eitherretrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Determine whether a `rescue(…)` or `emergencyWithdraw(…)` function exists callable by admin without a timelock delay on execution.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol kinetiq factor RD-F-041 score red collected_at 2026-05-17 15:29:57