Timelock on sensitive actions
JustLend DAO's assessment for RD-F-033 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Most sensitive actions (oracle change, collateral factor, market listing, implementation upgrade) route through Timelock admin. However, _reduceReserves() on jTokens routes through reserveAdmin (separate role — identity unconfirmed, may not be Timelock-controlled). pauseGuardian can halt markets without Timelock delay. Partial timelock coverage.
Sources #
- GitHubJustLend Comptroller.sol — admin functionsComptroller.sol: _setPriceOracle(), _setCollateralFactor(), _supportMarket() all check msg.sender != admin (Timelock-controlled). CToken.sol: _reduceReserves() checks msg.sender != reserveAdmin (separate role).retrieved 2026-05-17
- JustLend CToken.sol — _reduceReserves and reserveAdminCToken.sol: _reduceReserves() gated to reserveAdmin role; doTransferOut(reserveAdmin, reduceAmount) transfers to reserveAdmin address.retrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →
rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol justlend factor RD-F-033 score yellow collected_at 2026-05-17 10:25:32