Fallback behavior on oracle failure

Frax Finance's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

Fraxlend dual-oracle: if one feed is isBadData, borrowing halts — no soft fallback to last-known-price. BUIDL NAV (RedStone TSSO): single authoritative source by design (no fallback for regulated NAV data). USDC/USDT Chainlink feeds: no confirmed fallback if stale. AMO uses governance-approved reference rates as fallback mechanism. Yellow because some oracle paths have no fallback (BUIDL TSSO, AMO stablecoin feeds) and the Fraxlend halt-on-bad-data design, while protective, means zero oracle = zero lending.

Sources #

URL
Coindesk: Securitize RedStone TSSOCoindesk: Securitize RedStone TSSO is designed as trusted single source — no fallbackretrieved 2026-05-17
Docs
Frax Oracle OverviewFrax Oracle Overview — prices considered bad/stale if Chainlink signals bad or price too old; dual-oracle divergence haltretrieved 2026-05-17

Methodology #

Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol frax factor RD-F-051 score yellow collected_at 2026-05-16 20:44:31