Emergency-veto multisig present
Falcon Finance's assessment for RD-F-040 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No emergency-veto multisig identified. No CANCELLER_ROLE on any TimelockController (none exists). No circuit-breaker mechanism found in docs or contracts. The same 4-of-6 Safe is the only control mechanism.
Detail #
No TimelockController means no CANCELLER_ROLE to assign. No dedicated emergency-pause multisig found in the official smart contracts list or in audit reports. The Insurance Fund is a separate 4-of-6 Safe with different signers, but is not a veto/pause mechanism for protocol operations — it is a reserve fund. No emergency governance path documented.
Sources #
- DocsInsurance fund docs — separate Safe, not a protocol vetohttps://docs.falcon.finance/resources/insurance-fundretrieved 2026-05-12
- Falcon Finance smart contracts page — no timelock listedhttps://docs.falcon.finance/resources/smart-contractsretrieved 2026-05-12
Methodology #
Determine whether an emergency-veto or guardian multisig exists with power to cancel malicious proposals before execution.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →