Fallback behavior on oracle failure

Euler V2's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

Per-adapter fallback: ChainlinkOracle reverts (PriceOracle_TooStale) on stale data — no last-known-price fallback. PythOracle reverts on exceeded maxStaleness. UniswapV3Oracle: no staleness check beyond TWAP period. EulerRouter can have govSetFallbackOracle() configured; if set, failed primary routes to fallback. Without EulerRouter fallback, oracle failure = vault operation halt. No universal fallback; vault-specific based on EulerRouter usage.

Sources #

GitHub
ChainlinkOracle — Staleness CheckChainlinkOracle.sol _getQuote() staleness revert patternretrieved 2026-05-04
GitHub
EulerRouter — Fallback ConfigurationEulerRouter.sol govSetFallbackOracleretrieved 2026-05-04

Methodology #

Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol euler-v2 factor RD-F-051 score yellow collected_at 2026-05-04 19:56:06