★ Rescue/emergencyWithdraw without timelock
Ethena's assessment for RD-F-041 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
StakedUSDeV2 has rescueTokens() callable by DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE with no timelock. Function explicitly excludes USDe (primary staked asset) — cannot directly drain staked USDe. Also has redistributeLockedAmounts() — burns blacklisted sUSDe, mints to Ethena wallets — no timelock. Neither function has timelock protection. Drain risk materially limited by USDe exclusion in rescueTokens but redistributeLockedAmounts is an admin-callable fund movement without timelock.
Sources #
- EtherscanStakedUSDeV2 contract — DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE controls rescueTokens and redistributeLockedAmountshttps://etherscan.io/address/0x9D39A5DE30e57443BfF2A8307A4256c8797A3497retrieved 2026-04-28
- Staking Key Functions — rescueTokens excludes USDe; redistributeLockedAmounts burns blacklisted sUSDehttps://docs.ethena.fi/solution-design/staking-usde/staking-key-functionsretrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Determine whether a `rescue(…)` or `emergencyWithdraw(…)` function exists callable by admin without a timelock delay on execution.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →