Timelock on sensitive actions

deBridge's assessment for RD-F-033 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

No timelock on any sensitive action type. Mint/pause/fee/oracle-config/upgrade are all directly executable by multisig in a single transaction. withdrawFee, pause, setSignatureVerifier, updateAsset, upgradeTo are all untimelocked.

Sources #

GitHub
https://github.com/debridge-finance/debridge-contracts-v1/blob/main/contracts/transfers/DeBridgeGate.solretrieved 2026-04-28
Etherscan
https://etherscan.io/address/0x797161bcc625155d2302251404ccb93c2632658e#coderetrieved 2026-04-28

Methodology #

For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol debridge factor RD-F-033 score red collected_at 2026-04-28 01:27:58