Circuit breaker on price deviation
Curve Finance's assessment for RD-F-057 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No circuit breaker identified for StableSwap-NG rate oracle or CryptoSwap v2 EMA. CryptoSwap v2 has an informal spike cap: new last_prices[k] capped at 2 * price_scale[k] before EMA update (tweak_price() function) — prevents extreme single-trade spikes from propagating into the oracle. This is not a formal circuit breaker (no pause or revert-if-deviation logic). StableSwap-NG: no deviation check on rate oracle output.
Sources #
- GitHubCurve Tricrypto-NG main contractCurveTricryptoOptimizedWETH.vy tweak_price(): min(last_prices[k], 2 * price_scale[k]) — spike cap only, no full circuit breakerretrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
Determine whether the protocol halts or reverts if the oracle-reported price deviates by more than X% from a reference within Y blocks.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →