Large governance proposal queued
crvUSD (Curve Stablecoin)'s assessment for RD-F-101 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Large governance proposal queued (malicious-pattern flagged). Applicable: yes — Aragon Voting Ownership (0xE478de485ad2fe566d49342Cbd03E49ed7DB3356) is the vote entry-point. Key structural note: veCRV is non-transferable and time-locked (min 1 week, max 4 years), making flash-loanable weight structurally impossible for Curve DAO — the flash-loanable-weight sub-condition of this signal cannot fire. Active governance at gov.curve.fi as of 2026-05-16 shows routine operational proposals (LlamaRisk quarterly grant, Yield Basis CRV allocation debates) — none matching malicious-pattern criteria (no admin role change, no delegatecall to non-allowlisted target, no new-wallet proposer). Signal would NOT fire today. [T-09 v1 production signal]
Sources #
- GovernanceCurve DAO governance forumgov.curve.fi — active proposals as of 2026-05-16; routine operational votes only, no malicious-pattern proposalsretrieved 2026-05-16
- Curve Voting Ownership EtherscanAragon Voting Ownership 0xE478de485ad2fe566d49342Cbd03E49ed7DB3356 — vote entry-point for crvUSD governanceretrieved 2026-05-16
- Curve DAO veCRV documentationcurve.readthedocs.io dao-vecrv: veCRV is non-transferable and requires lock-up; flash-loan governance attack structurally impossibleretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Detect whether a governance proposal with potentially protocol-impactful payload has been queued for execution (including Security-Council threshold-reduction variant).
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →