Bridge rate-limiter / chain-pause as positive mitigant
Convex Finance's assessment for RD-F-185 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Convex is not a bridge so the factor applies only partially. Positive mitigants present: (1) Booster.shutdownSystem() callable by admin (via BoosterOwner, with 30-day forceShutdown delay for LP-mismatch emergency or directly for standard shutdown) enables an orderly withdrawal mode protecting user funds. (2) vlCVX.shutdown() callable by owner enables emergency withdrawal. No per-window outflow rate limiter on deposits. No independent chain-pause capability. Partial positive credit for protocol-level emergency shutdown capability.
Sources #
- DocsConvex Finance -- Known IssuesshutdownSystem described as protective measure preventing new pool additionsretrieved 2026-05-16
- Convex BoosterOwner.sol -- GitHub sourceBoosterOwner.sol: shutdownSystem(), queueForceShutdown(), forceShutdownSystem() -- graduated shutdown with 30-day forceShutdown delayretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Determine whether the bridge implements a per-window outflow rate-limiter (and at what cap), and whether the protocol team can trigger a chain-level or validator-set emergency pause.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →