Avg attacker reconnaissance time for peer-class protocols

Evidence summary #

Lending protocol peer class average reconnaissance time >30 days (78-day USPD pattern; 2024 Proposal 289 required multi-week COMP accumulation). Compound V3's clean exploit record (rekt.incidents: []) supports green class posture. Sufficient warning window if monitoring deployed.

Detail #

Hack DB analysis for lending protocol class: USPD-class reconnaissance documented at 78 days for sophisticated DeFi attacks (T-01 cluster analysis). Compound V3-specific evidence: the 2024 Proposal 289 governance attack required multi-week COMP accumulation (whale-accumulation method, not flash-loan), suggesting a reconnaissance/preparation window of weeks. The rsETH exploit did not involve Compound-specific reconnaissance — V3 was a secondary drain venue. Protocol class average >30 days meets the green threshold (>=30 days = sufficient warning window if monitoring deployed). rekt.incidents: [] (no direct V3 exploits in hack DB).

Sources #

Methodology #

Report the average number of days of attacker reconnaissance activity before a strike on peer-class protocols (lending/DEX/bridge/perps), sourced from the hack database.

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →