Bridge tracks nonce-consumed mapping
Compound V3 (Comet)'s assessment for RD-F-153 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
BaseBridgeReceiver implements replay protection via local Timelock queuedTransactions mapping. Duplicate message delivery rejected because transaction hash already queued/executed. OZ audit reviewed and confirmed.
Detail #
OpenZeppelin audit documents that the governance relay implements replay protection via the local Timelock's transaction-hash tracking. The audit also identified a minor discrepancy in transaction expiration logic (medium severity, resolved in PR 666 at commit fcb9ef3). No replay attack vector was found.
Sources #
- AuditOpenZeppelin Bridge Receiver Audit — transaction queuingOpenZeppelin Compound Polygon Bridge Receiver Audit — replay protectionretrieved 2026-04-27
Methodology #
Determine whether the bridge inbox maintains a nonce-consumed mapping and rejects replay of used nonces.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →