Timelock on sensitive actions
Compound V3 (Comet)'s assessment for RD-F-033 — scored yellow on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Upgrade: timelocked (CometProxyAdmin.owner = Timelock). Oracle config (Configurator): timelocked. Market params: timelocked. Fund drain (approveThis, withdrawReserves): timelocked (governor = Timelock). Pause: NOT timelocked (Community MultiSig direct pause, by design as emergency mechanism). 4 of 5 sensitive action classes timelocked; pause intentionally exempt.
Sources #
- Etherscanhttps://etherscan.io/address/0x1EC63B5883C3481134FD50D5DAebc83Ecd2E8779retrieved 2026-04-28
- https://docs.compound.finance/governance/retrieved 2026-04-28
Methodology #
For each sensitive action category (mint / pause / rescue / setOracle / upgrade), determine whether execution requires going through the declared timelock.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →