Fallback behavior on oracle failure
Circle USYC's assessment for RD-F-051 — scored red on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
No fallback oracle or circuit-breaker logic identified. Single push-oracle reporter (immutable _reporter 0x9fde717a21c5b272B8956d3AA0c3551E1FFd23D7). No try/catch, no secondary source, no last-known-price fallback confirmed in Teller or oracle contract source. If reporter address stops transmitting, stale NAV is accepted silently. Issuer-attested RWA oracle design - no independent fallback by design. Red per taxonomy threshold (no fallback documented).
Sources #
- EtherscanGenericNextPriceAggregator Oracle Implementation - EtherscanGenericNextPriceAggregator at 0x6DeaA761bc131Ac5f1D562EE71819E846EF11624 - transmit() is the only price-update function; immutable _reporter is sole data source; no fallback functionretrieved 2026-05-16
- Teller Implementation ABI - EtherscanTeller implementation ABI at 0xF8724D6b9E6fF55Bc4496fddb3437DC691CD26EB - no fallback oracle function in ABIretrieved 2026-05-16
Methodology #
Identify the declared fallback behavior (pause, secondary source, last-known-price, revert) when the primary oracle reverts or reports a stale value.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →