Avg attacker reconnaissance time for peer-class protocols
Cap (cUSD / stcUSD)'s assessment for RD-F-163 — scored gray on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.
Evidence summary #
Narrative signal — average attacker wallet reconnaissance time before strike on similar-class protocols. Cap is a novel SSN-backed yield stablecoin / credit marketplace with no direct peer-class exploit precedent. Analogous attack classes: SSN underwriting manipulation (operator default), oracle manipulation, governance takeover via multisig compromise. Typical recon times per T-01 evidence: USPD-class 78 days average; Drift insider implant 6 days. No specific recon pattern detected targeting Cap. Curator must classify Cap's peer class (closest: yield stablecoin / credit marketplace or synthetic-dollar protocols) to establish baseline. Cannot compute numeric delta without curator input.
Sources #
- InternalTaxonomy Cat 11 — RD-F-163 reconnaissance timeresearch/outputs/03-taxonomy.md Cat 11 RD-F-163 definition (avg 78-day recon window per T-01 evidence)retrieved 2026-05-17
- Cap protocol profile — novel architecture.research/protocols/cap/00-profile.md §1 (novel architecture — no fork, no peer-class exploit precedent)retrieved 2026-05-17
Methodology #
Report the average number of days of attacker reconnaissance activity before a strike on peer-class protocols (lending/DEX/bridge/perps), sourced from the hack database.
See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →