UUPS _authorizeUpgrade correctly permissioned

Cap (cUSD / stcUSD)'s assessment for RD-F-021 — scored green on the v1.7.0 rubric. The evidence below is the curator's reasoning for this score.

Evidence summary #

All inspected UUPS implementation contracts implement _authorizeUpgrade() with access control: CapToken.sol (checkAccess(bytes4(0))), StakedCap.sol (checkAccess(bytes4(0))), Lender.sol (checkAccess(bytes4(0))), EigenAgentManager.sol (checkAccess pattern), SymbioticNetworkMiddleware.sol (checkAccess(bytes4(0))), OFTLockboxUpgradeable.sol (onlyOwner). All upgrade paths require authorization via the AccessControl contract chain (Timelock → dev multisig).

Sources #

GitHub
StakedCap.sol — _authorizeUpgradecontracts/token/StakedCap.sol — _authorizeUpgrade: checkAccess(bytes4(0))retrieved 2026-05-17
GitHub
CapToken.sol — _authorizeUpgradecontracts/token/CapToken.sol — _authorizeUpgrade: checkAccess(bytes4(0))retrieved 2026-05-17
GitHub
Lender.sol — _authorizeUpgradecontracts/lendingPool/Lender.sol — _authorizeUpgrade: checkAccess(bytes4(0))retrieved 2026-05-17

Methodology #

Determine whether the UUPS implementation defines `_authorizeUpgrade(address)` restricted to owner/admin/timelock (not open to arbitrary callers).

See the full factor methodology and distribution across all protocols →

rubric_version v1.7.0 protocol cap factor RD-F-021 score green collected_at 2026-05-17 10:56:24